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This article argues that the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol) reconceptualizes the idea of 
transitional justice mechanisms as varying approaches meant solely to address the legacy 
of abuse in one nation, and proposes that transitional justice mechanisms can also 
encompass regional and transnational efforts to respond to mass human rights violations. 
It also argues that the Protocol seeks to correct for perceived biases in international criminal 
justice. The article illuminates the ways in which the Protocol builds on the justice cascade. 
It provides a brief overview of the domestic, hybrid and international criminal trials in 
Africa that have informed the development of the regional court, and argues that the 
Malabo Protocol offers the Continent an important, alternative vision of regional criminal 
justice. The article concludes that the regional court could arguably tailor criminal 
accountability to the context, needs and aspirations of the Continent. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The African Union (AU) adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol) in May 2014, 
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which, if ratified, will create the first-ever regional criminal court (RCC).1 In this article, I 
argue that the Protocol is a development that could reshape the ‘justice cascade’ in 
beneficial ways.2 The justice cascade is a metaphor that Kathryn Sikkink used to describe 
the spread of accountability systems throughout the globe. Yet, much of that project 
focused on the spread of prosecutions in Europe and Latin America. The African 
experience with justice mechanisms challenges the narrative of a unidirectional ‘cascade’ 
toward holding individual state officials, including heads of state, criminally accountable 
for human rights violations. 
While the Protocol is part of the increasing resort to criminal trials to address mass 
violence, it also challenges the gaps in existing models of accountability. First, it re-
conceptualizes transitional justice from varying approaches meant solely to address the 
legacy of abuse in one nation, and instead proposes that it can also encompass regional 
efforts. Second, by shifting the locus and the gaze, the Protocol seeks to limit the utilization 
of international criminal law (ICL) to advance the interests of powerful states in the Global 
North and to counteract perceived biases. The Protocol allows us to think more creatively 
about what the ‘justice cascade’ could look like – the types of claims, actors covered, as 
well as the appropriate levels of adjudication. 
Literature assessing the Protocol is emerging. Yet, much analysis concentrates on 
questions of doctrinal compatibility between the RCC and the Rome Statute of the 
                                                          
1 ‘Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights,’ AU Doc. No. STC/Legal/Min. 7(1) Rev.1 (14 May 2014) [hereinafter ‘Malabo 
Protocol’]. The AU Assembly adopted the Malabo Protocol on 30 June 2014 at its 23rd Ordinary 
Session. See, AU Doc. No. Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII).  
2 For a discussion of the spread of criminal trials, see, Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How 
Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New York: WW Norton & Company). 
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International Criminal Court (ICC).3 Conventional wisdom on the Protocol views it as a 
negative development that works to insulate the ‘dictators club’ from facing justice.4 
Accordingly, some view the RCC as undermining key gains.5   
I argue that the Protocol offers the Continent an important, alternative vision of 
regional criminal justice. In the remainder of this article, I first provide context on the RCC 
before giving an overview of the domestic, hybrid and international criminal trials in Africa 
that have informed the emergence of the RCC. I then discuss how a regional approach 
could arguably tailor criminal accountability to African realities.  
 There are numerous political, financial and other obstacles that may impede the 
RCC’s effectiveness, if it comes into existence. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
address these constraints.6 Instead, I seek to demonstrate how the doctrinal innovations in 
the Protocol potentially reshape important aspects of the justice cascade.  
 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Chacha Bhoke Murungu, ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights,’ Journal of International Criminal Justice 9(5) (2011): 1067–1088. Murungu 
contends that the Rome Statute only envisioned domestic trials for complementarity. But see, 
Ademola Abass, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges,’ 
European Journal of International Law 24(3) (2013): 933–946 for an argument that the Rome 
Statute is not a hierarchical treaty that precludes states from entering others. 
4 See, generally, Lutz Oette, ‘The African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur: A Precedent for 
Regional Solutions to the Challenges Facing International Criminal Justice?’ in Africa and the 
Future of International Criminal Justice, ed. Vincent Nmehielle (The Hague: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2012). Oette argues that the RCC gives license to impunity. 
5 See, Kristen Rau, ‘Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability Avoidance? The International 
Criminal Court and Proposed Expansion of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,’ 
Minnesota Law Review 97(2) (2012): 669–708. 
6 See, Matiangai Sirleaf, ‘Regionalism, Regime Complexes and the Crisis in International Criminal 
Justice,’ Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 54(699) (2016), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293988 (accessed 13 December 2016). 
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A. THE REGIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
This section discusses the method of creation and structure of the RCC, the crimes covered 
and the scope of criminal liability under it.  
 
1. Method of Creation and Structure  
 
Regional integration in Africa expanded from human rights to encompass both quotidian 
criminal law and ICL matters.7 Initially, the regional human rights system consisted of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights8 and the quasi-judicial African 
Commission.9 The Organization of African Unity created the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights10 in 1998 to be the judicial organ for enforcing the African Charter as well 
as other human rights treaties.11   
African states founded the AU with a stronger commitment to human rights.12 
Given its many objectives and enhanced role in maintaining peace and security,13 it is 
unsurprising that the AU created the RCC. Regional integration in criminal matters could 
                                                          
7 Cf. Abass, supra n 3, for a discussion of criminalizing issues peculiar to Africa. 
8 ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,’ OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 
217; 21 ILM 58 (27 June 1981; entered into force 21 October 1986). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (10 June 1998; entered into force 25 January 2004).  
11 Muna Ndulo, ‘The African Commission and Court under the African Human Rights System,’ in 
Africa’s Human Rights Architecture, ed. John Akokpari and Daniel Shea Zimbler (Auckland Park: 
Fanele, 2008). 
12 ‘Constitutive Act of the African Union,’ 2158 UNTS I-37733 (11 July 2000) [hereinafter ‘AU 
Constitutive Act’].  
13 Ibid.  
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allow states to respond to common security threats more effectively,14 because neighboring 
states have a greater interest in cooperating. For example, the AU is the only institution 
empowered to intervene forcibly in grave violations of human rights and the only 
organization that incorporates the responsibility to protect.15 Additionally, the AU adopted 
a treaty on democracy, which empowered it to suspend members following an 
unconstitutional change in government.16 Moreover, it provided for a court predating the 
RCC with the ability to prosecute alleged perpetrators.17    
The RCC has a complex history. In 2004, the AU decided to merge the African 
Court of Justice and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. In 2008, the AU 
adopted a Protocol generating the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.18 In 2014, 
the AU proposed including the RCC.19 Under this tripartite court, the RCC will adjudicate 
ICL violations while the other two chambers will be dedicated to determining international 
human rights violations and issues of general international law respectively.20 The tripartite 
court was proposed due to funding concerns and the proliferation of institutions. If it comes 
                                                          
14 Ricardo Pereira, ‘The Regionalization of Criminal Law: The Example of European Criminal 
Law,’ in The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law, ed. Larissa van den 
Herik and Carsten Stahn (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). 
15 AU Constitutive Act. See also, Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, ‘The Right of Forcible Intervention in 
Certain Conflicts,’ in The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework – a Manual on the 
Pan-African Organization, ed. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf and Fatsah Ouguergouz (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2012).  
16 See, ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,’ AU Doc. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.147 (VIII) (30 January 2007; entered into force 15 February 2012). 
17 Ibid. 
18 ‘Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,’ 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights-en.pdf 
(accessed 13 December 2016) [hereinafter ‘Merger Protocol’]. Five countries ratified, but 15 were 
required.   
19 Malabo Protocol.  
20 Merger Protocol.  
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into being, the RCC will have a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber and an Appellate 
Chamber.21 The Protocol requires 15 ratifications before it can come into force; to date 
only nine states have signed it.22 Yet, treaty ratification is a lengthy process.  
Under the tripartite structure, ICL issues may not be marginalized as states submit 
to judicial oversight from the other chambers and the larger Court gains credibility. 
Conversely, this assessment may seem sanguine given the experience of continental sub-
regional bodies.23 However, competitors like Nigeria and South Africa may impede the 
ability of one hegemon to capture proceedings. Nevertheless, there is always the danger of 
powerful states exercising undue influence.  
Indeed, ICL courts suffer from the impression that political concerns predominate 
over criminality considerations.24 While most efforts have had significant UN or 
Permanent Five (P5) member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) involvement,25 the 
Protocol departs from this. Instead, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, 
and the Peace and Security Council of the AU, as well as state parties and the independent 
                                                          
21 Malabo Protocol. 
22 See, African Union, ‘Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights,’ http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-sl-
protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_
human_rights_19.pdf (accessed 12 December 2016). 
23 See, e.g., Tendayi Achiume, ‘Dissonance, Judicial Lawmaking, the Authority of International 
Courts: Lessons from SADC,’ in The Authority of International Courts, ed. Karen Alter, Laurence 
Helfer, and Mikael Rask Madsen (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2017); Frederick Cowell, 
‘The Death of the Southern African Development Community Tribunal’s Human Rights 
Jurisdiction,’ Human Rights Law Review 13(1) (2013): 153–166.   
24 See, Peter Stoett, ‘Justice, Peace, and Windmills:  An Analysis of “Live Indictments” by the 
International Criminal Court,’ in Trials and Tribulations of International Prosecution, ed. Henry 
Carey and Stacey Mitchell (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013). 
25 See, ‘Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,’ 2178 UNTS 138 (12 April 2002) [hereinafter 
‘SCSL Statute’]. See also, S/Res/1315 (14 August 2000). 
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prosecutor26 can submit cases to the RCC.27 As such, the RCC may be less likely to 
reproduce geopolitical hierarchies between the Global North and South. 
The RCC could potentially address charges of a foreign institution imposing its 
will. The sensitivities to Western intervention, given the experiences of slavery, 
colonialism and neocolonialism,28 may allow the RCC to operate with less perceived 
baggage. However innocuous their operations, global institutions are not always optimal 
and different regions may have particularities that cannot be penetrated. The RCC may 
achieve a balance between the local and the international with the former being too close 
and susceptible to political capture by powerful elites, and the latter being too remote and 
subject to geopolitics.   
 
2. Crimes Covered 
Historically, the field of ICL has been preoccupied with crisis. The Protocol disrupts this 
pattern.29 While reaffirming jurisdiction over ‘core’ international crimes (genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression),30 the Protocol expands criminal liability 
                                                          
26 Malabo Protocol. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See, Henry Richardson, ‘African Grievances and the International Criminal Court:  Issues of 
African Equity under International Criminal Law,’ in Africa and the Future of International 
Criminal Justice, ed. Vincent Nmehielle (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2012). 
29 See, e.g., ‘UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court,’ UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III) (15 June–17 July 1998), part 
2(F)(3) art. 5, citing drug trafficking and terrorism as potential ICC crimes. Cf. ‘Rome Statute of the 
ICC,’ 2187 UNTS 90 (17 July 1998), art. 5 [hereinafter ‘Rome Statute’] with Malabo Protocol, arts. 
28G (criminalizing terrorism), 28K (criminalizing trafficking in drugs). 
30 Malabo Protocol, arts. 28B (genocide), 28C (crimes against humanity), 28D (war crimes), 28M 
(crime of aggression), with Rome Statute, art. 5 (enumerating the same crimes). For jurisdiction 
over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, see also, ‘Statute for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,’ UN Doc. S/Res/955 (8 November 1994) arts. 2–4 (jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) [hereinafter ‘ICTR Statute’].  
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to trafficking in humans, drugs and hazardous waste, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism and 
corruption, among others. By straddling quotidian and crisis crimes, the Protocol 
destabilizes ICL’s hierarchy, reflecting both the background and foreground of violations. 
It recognizes that massive atrocities do not take place in a vacuum, but instead are 
embedded in systems of criminality.31   
Unsurprisingly, most of the Protocol’s provisions concern common security 
threats.32 The inclusion of security-threatening crimes responds to African realities. For 
example, African borders are notoriously illusory, which renders these states more 
susceptible to transnational crimes. Inherited colonial borders have sustained much 
instability in the region.33 Furthermore, neglect of borders has contributed to criminality, 
making these areas susceptible to insurgents and terrorist groups.34 For example, West 
Africa is especially vulnerable to cross-border criminal activities.35 In the Great Lakes sub-
region, the proliferation of light weapons has fueled conflicts.36 In the East African sub-
region, the spate of terrorist attacks from neighboring Somalia has rendered Kenya 
                                                          
31 For a discussion of challenges addressing mass criminality, see, Lars Waldorf, ‘Mass Justice for 
Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice,’ Temple Law Review 79(1) (2006): 
1–87.  
32 See, e.g., Malabo Protocol, art. 28LBis, criminalizing exploitation of natural resources; Sébastien 
Porter, ‘The Exploitation of Natural Resources and Land Grabbing,’ Africa Europe Faith and 
Justice Network, http://www.aefjn.org/index.php/370/articles/the-exploitation-of-natural-
resources-and-land-grabbing.html (accessed 13 December 2016).  
33 See, Francis Nguendi Ikome, ‘Africa’s International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and 
Future Threats to Peace and Security,’ Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 233 (May 2012).  
34 See, ‘African Union Leaders Look to Enhance Terror Fight,’ Telesur, 3 September 2014, 
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/African-Union-Leaders-Look-to-Enhance-Terror-Fight-
20140903-0056.html (accessed 13 December 2016). 
35 See, Prosper Addo, ‘Cross-Border Criminal Activities in West Africa: Options for Effective 
Responses,’ Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Paper No. 12 (May 2006).  
36 See, Paul Eavis, ‘SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Ways 
Forward,’ Brown Journal of World Affairs 9(1) (2002): 251–260.  
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particularly exposed.37 Because many conflicts and transnational crimes in Africa tend to 
have a contagion effect, the RCC may be the best-placed institution to address this 
phenomenon.  
In Malabo, African states decided to expand the number of crimes deserving 
regional, if not international, attention.38 While not all the Protocol’s provisions reflect a 
security nexus,39 it certainly reproduces the trend of turning to criminal trials to resolve 
complex political problems. Yet, because the RCC’s expansion of criminal liability could 
lead to greater normative consistency and perhaps deterrence of both quotidian and crisis 
crimes, it renders the justice cascade more relevant to African realities.  
 
3. Corporate Criminal Liability 
The Protocol’s provision in Article 46C for corporate criminal liability also renders the 
justice cascade more pertinent. Virtually no ICL courts have jurisdiction over corporate 
entities.40 Corporate criminal liability was debated during discussions for a permanent 
court in the 1950s,41 and also mooted during ICC negotiations in 1998.42 Some jurisdictions 
                                                          
37 See generally, Joshua Meservey, ‘False Security in Kenya:  When Counterterrorism Is 
Counterproductive,’ Foreign Affairs, 21 January 2015.  
38 Abass, supra n 3 at 939, discusses the perception that rejected ICC crimes do not ‘constitute 
international crimes at all,’ or the perception that proffered crimes were not ‘serious’ enough’. 
39 Malabo Protocol, art. 28I (criminalizing corruption). See also, Sonja B. Starr, ‘Extraordinary 
Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice beyond Crisis Situations,’ Northwestern University 
Law Review 101(3) (2007): 1257–1314. Starr argues for the prosecution of corruption. 
40 See, e.g., Rome Statute; ICTR Statute. 
41 See, ‘Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction,’ UN Doc. A/2136 (1952); 
‘Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction,’ UN Doc. A/2645 (1953). 
42 See, Andrew Clapham, ‘The Question of Jurisdiction under International Criminal Law over 
Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference,’ in Liability of Multinational Corporations 
under International Law, ed. Menno Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (Boston, MA: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000). 
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allow for it, while others do not, complicating enforcement and preventing speedy treaty 
making.43 Notably, the Control Council passed laws aimed at punishing corporations after 
World War II.44 While no corporations were actually prosecuted, nothing legally prevented 
such prosecutions.45   
The Protocol permits jurisdiction over both natural persons and entities on 
established bases – consent, territorial, nationality, passive personality and protective 
principles. This represents a significant advancement of ICL.46 The devastating impact of 
corporate malfeasance in Africa explains this development.47 The Protocol could enable 
African states to respond more effectively to challenges posed by corporations,48 thereby 
transforming the justice cascade. 
                                                          
43 Joanna Kyriakakis, ‘Article 46C: Corporate Criminal Liability at the African Criminal Court,’ in 
The African Court of Justice and Human and People’s Rights, ed. Kamari Clarke and Charles Jalloh 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2017). 
44 See, e.g., Control Council Law No. 57, ‘Dissolution and Liquidation of Insurance Companies 
Connected with the German Labor Front,’ in Legal Division, Office of Military Government for 
Germany, Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee 
Vol. 8 (30 August 1947); Control Council Law No. 9, ‘Seizure of Property Owned by I.G. 
Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof,’ in Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control 
Council and Coordinating Committee Vol. 1 (30 November 1945) (providing for corporate 
dissolution and destruction of infrastructure). See also, Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment 
of I.G. Farben (London: André Deutsch, 1979).  
45 See, e.g., Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein, ‘Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones:  How 
Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights,’ Harvard International Law 
Journal – Online 52 (2010): 119–135; Jonathan A. Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations and 
Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said,’ Columbia Law Review 
109(5) (2009): 1094–1242; ‘The Flick Case,’ in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg 
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 6 (1952), 1190–1191 (‘no justification 
for a limitation of responsibility to public officials’).  
46 See, Philipp Ambach, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of Transnational Corporate Actors 
Doing Business in Zones of Armed Conflict,’ in Investment Law within International Law: 
Integrationist Perspectives, ed. Freya Baetens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
47 See, e.g., ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,’ UN Doc. S/2002/1146 
(2002); ‘Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions,’ UN Doc S/2000/1225 
(2000); ‘Report of the Panel of Experts in Relation to Sierra Leone,’ UN Doc. S/2000/1195 (2000).  
48 See, Kyriakakis, supra n 43. 
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4. Official Immunity 
The Protocol also complicates the unidirectional account of justice cascade enthusiasts. In 
stark contrast with other ICL courts,49 it immunizes any  
serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act 
in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during 
their tenure of office.50   
This provision refers to official and functional immunities provided under customary 
international law (CIL). The former pertain to a limited group because of their office, while 
functional immunities attach to acts performed by state officials in the exercise of their 
functions.51 Official immunities have been deemed necessary to maintain international 
peace and cooperation.52   
The main judicial body of the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), held in 
the Arrest Warrant decision that an official enjoyed immunity from prosecution in foreign 
national courts under CIL because he was then serving as a foreign minister.53 The ICJ in 
dictum discussed exceptions to CIL immunity which allow for prosecution. One of these 
is treaty-based jurisdiction.54 If only a treaty-based exception to official immunities exists, 
                                                          
49 Rome Statute, art. 27 (irrelevance of official capacity for criminal responsibility). See also, 
ICTR Statute; SCSL Statute; Mark Kersten, ‘What Gives? African Union Head of State 
Immunity,’ Justice in Conflict, 7 July 2014. 
50 Malabo Protocol, art. 46A bis.  
51 See, Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and 
Foreign Domestic Courts,’ European Journal of International Law 21(4) (2011): 815–852.  
52 See, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment 
(14 February 2002) [hereinafter ‘Arrest Warrant Case’] (separate opinion by Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal). 
53 See, ibid. See also, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth 
Session,’ UN Doc. A/RES/68/112 (16 December 2013). 
54 Arrest Warrant Case.  
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then it is permissible for states to form treaties to the contrary.55 If the prohibition on 
official immunities is a developing norm of CIL, then the Protocol undermines general and 
consistent state practice necessary for CIL to form.56 State practice includes ICL statutes 
supporting the prohibition.57 It also includes the prosecutions of former heads of states – 
Hissène Habré, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milošević and Charles Taylor. Yet, these 
prosecutions took place after they left office, although the latter two were indicted during 
their presidencies, along with Omar al-Bashir who has not yet been prosecuted.  
The Protocol’s immunity provision also challenges the second prong of CIL 
formation – opinio juris. It undermines claims that states are acting out of a sense of legal 
obligation in prohibiting official immunity. The provision may also represent an attempt to 
utilize the rules of persistent objection in CIL,58 which would exempt parties to the 
Protocol.  
This provision undermines the conventional justice cascade account of ever-
expanding prosecutions, while the traditional model of immunity for states and officials 
recedes. While the immunity provision does not impact the jurisdiction of other ICL courts, 
it makes explicit the de facto immunity that already exists for more powerful states in 
ICL.59 The drafters likely included greater protections in the Protocol due to the dramatic 
expansion of criminal liability. The provision has blinded commentators from considering 
                                                          
55 See, ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,’ 1155 UNTS 331 (23 May 1969), art. 38 (treaty 
norm becomes binding on nonparties when the norm is CIL) [hereinafter ‘VCLT’]. 
56 See, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987), sec. 102(2). 
57 See, e.g., ‘Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal,’ 82 UNTS 280 (8 August 1945); 
‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,’ TIAS No. 1589 (19 January 1946). 
58 The only way CIL is nonbinding is if a state persistently objects to the emergence of the rule at 
the time of formation. See, VCLT.  
59 See, Sirleaf, supra n 6. 
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how regionalization of ICL could potentially uniquely position regional mechanisms in the 
justice cascade.  
 
B. THE JUSTICE CASCADE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RCC 
The African continent has been fertile ground for accountability experimentation since the 
1990s, with approaches ranging from judicial to non-judicial mechanisms like truth 
commissions, reparations and community-based processes. This section focuses on the 
plethora of judicial institutions that have flourished and situates the RCC as part of the turn 
to criminal trials across the Continent to address mass violence. The increasing resort to 
domestic, hybrid and international criminal trials set the stage for the RCC. This section 
highlights the challenges experienced in the justice cascade, which the RCC could 
potentially help address.  
 
1. Domestic Trials  
The African ‘justice cascade’ includes domestic trials. The purported benefits of national 
trials include providing greater accountability, restoring decimated legal systems, 
producing quicker results and including local sentiments regarding punishment.60 This 
subsection examines Rwanda’s and Côte d’Ivoire’s experiences with domestic trials. 
After the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army came to power, it arrested and 
detained those suspected of committing genocide and serious violations of ICL. The 
international community expressed concerns with the hundreds of thousands of people 
                                                          
60 José E. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda,’ Yale Journal of 
International Law 24(2) (1999): 365–483. 
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imprisoned while awaiting trial. Further, it considered Rwanda’s trials as a way for the 
government to intimidate its political opponents.61 The trials exposed the weakness of the 
country’s judicial system following the conflict.  
Rwanda searched for an alternative accountability process and instituted gacaca 
to alleviate prison overcrowding and to assist with societal reconstruction. Gacaca was a 
mechanism used in precolonial Rwanda to adjudicate communal disputes often linked to 
property issues, personal injury or inheritance problems. In the early 2000s, the Rwandan 
legislature adopted a modernized version, which established gacaca jurisdictions. Per the 
government, gacaca facilitated truth telling, promoted reconciliation, eradicated impunity 
and demonstrated Rwanda’s ability to address its own problems. With an estimated 12,000 
community-based courts and 169,000 judges,62 gacaca accelerated trials that overwhelmed 
the formal judicial system. In 2012, gacaca concluded with almost two million genocide-
related cases tried.63 The entire process reportedly cost US$48.5 million,64 which is a 
fraction of the cost of the ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda.  
Commentators disparaged gacaca for failing to meet international fair trial 
standards.65 They were concerned that gacaca provided inadequate guarantees for 
impartiality, defense and equality before the law, especially because most who were 
ultimately tried were ethnic Hutus or dissidents. Gacaca had uneven results facilitating 
                                                          
61 Alison des Forges and Timothy Longman, ‘Legal Response to Genocide in Rwanda,’ in My 
Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, ed. Eric Stover and 
Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  




65 See, e.g., Susan Thomson, ‘The Darker Side of Transitional Justice: The Power Dynamics behind 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,’ Africa 81(3) (2011): 373–390. 
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justice and reconciliation in some communities.66 The limitations of national trials and 
community-based justice mechanisms in Rwanda paved the way for greater 
experimentation.  
In Côte d’Ivoire, following the postelection violence of 2010 that left 3,000 people 
dead, the government established accountability mechanisms. In 2011, it created a 
temporary body to conduct investigations into violent crimes, economic crimes and attacks 
on state security.67 In 2013, this was transformed into a permanent institution. The 
investigations led to limited trials that have targeted supporters of the former president, 
Laurent Gbagbo.68 Domestic trials in Côte d’Ivoire have also experienced structural and 
financial issues, which have hindered cases from moving forward.69 Moreover, the 
lopsided nature of indictments focusing on one group has undermined the credibility of the 
process. The ICC also began cases at Côte d’Ivoire’s request in 2013,70 against Charles Blé 
Goudé, an ally of the former president, and against the former first lady, Simone Gbagbo. 
Yet the government has refused to transfer the latter to the ICC, preferring to prosecute her 
domestically.71   
Rwanda’s and Côte d’Ivoire’s challenges with mounting national prosecutions 
centered on capacity constraints and lack of political will. These experiences, especially 
                                                          
66 See, Phil Clark, ‘The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement: The Gacaca Courts and Post-Genocide 
Justice, Healing and Reconciliation in Rwanda,’ in After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and beyond, ed. Philip Clark and Zachary 
Kaufman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
67 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Disappointed Hope: Judicial Handling of 
Post-Election Violence in Cote d’Ivoire (April 2016). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Pre-Trial Chamber III (23 
November 2011). 
71 ICTJ, supra n 67.  
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the failure to meet international fair trial standards, indicate the key limitations of domestic 
trials. The national processes discussed above spurred the AU to create a permanent 
regional court as opposed to relying on the judiciaries of individual states. The success that 
African states had with hybrid courts also influenced this move.   
 
2. Hybrid Courts 
The African ‘justice cascade’ includes the utilization of hybrid courts aimed at 
counteracting the culture of impunity. They typically have foreign and domestic judges and 
personnel sharing experiences. Hybrid courts also incorporate a blend of international and 
domestic law. They are perceived as improving on purely domestic processes because of 
the typically damaged state of the judiciary following a conflict or period of authoritarian 
rule. The additional human and material resources that accompany hybrid courts help to 
bolster what might otherwise be fledgling national processes. This subsection examines 
Sierra Leone’s and Senegal’s experiences with hybrid courts. It also highlights the 
proposed courts in South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR).  
Sierra Leone’s hybrid court72 followed a period of protracted civil war. The 
government requested the UN to create a court to try the main rebel group.73  Instead, the 
UN created the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to prosecute all persons ‘who bear 
                                                          
72 The Special Court for Sierra Leone coexisted with a truth commission. For further discussion, 
see, Matiangai Sirleaf, ‘Regional Approach to Transitional Justice? Examining the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Liberia,’ Florida Journal of 
International Law 21(2) (2009): 209–285. 
73 See, ‘Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission Vol. 3B,’ 
2004, http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume3B.pdf (accessed 13 December 
2016) (citing Letter from Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone, to Kofi 
Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, 12 June 2000). 
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the greatest responsibility’ for violations of ICL and Sierra Leonean law.74 Notably, the 
SCSL also sat where the war crimes occurred for its proceedings to be more impactful. Of 
the 13 individuals initially indicted by the SCSL, nine are currently serving sentences 
ranging from 15 to 50 years, including the high-profile sentence of former Liberian 
president Charles Taylor.  
The SCSL’s jurisprudence is notable for rendering the first judgment for the crime 
of recruiting and using child soldiers in hostilities,75 securing the first conviction for ‘forced 
marriage’ as a crime against humanity76 and the first conviction treating ‘attacking 
peacekeepers’ as a war crime.77 The SCSL is also recognized for contributing to democratic 
consolidation, peacebuilding and reducing the culture of impunity.78   
Yet, the Court’s limited approach has meant that mid- and lower-level officials 
who directly and visibly perpetrated abuses have not been tried. Additionally, 
commentators have criticized the SCSL for paying insufficient attention to capacity 
building. Moreover, the SCSL lost an opportunity to shape national jurisprudence by 
failing to bring any charges under Sierra Leonean law.79 Notwithstanding these limitations, 
Sierra Leone’s experience has served as a model for others.  
                                                          
74 See, ‘Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,’ 2178 UNTS 137 (16 January 2002). 
75 See generally, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals 
Judgment (22 February 2008). 
76 See generally, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment (2 March 2009). 
77 Ibid. 
78 See, Matiangai Sirleaf, ‘Beyond Truth and Punishment in Transitional Justice,’ Virginia Journal 
of International Law 54(195) (2014): 223–294. 
79 See, Tom Perriello and Marieke Wierda, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone under Scrutiny,’ 
International Center for Transitional Justice (March 2006). 
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In Senegal, the AU instituted the Extraordinary African Chambers to prosecute 
former Chadian president, Hissène Habré. Belgium wanted to prosecute Habré, who was 
exiled in Senegal, for ICL violations. Senegal originally refused to extradite him to 
Belgium and contended that they lacked the power to prosecute him domestically.80 A sub-
regional court in West Africa held that Habré could only be prosecuted internationally 
because Senegal’s courts lacked jurisdiction at the time.81 The ICJ also ordered Senegal to 
extradite Habré to Belgium, if it did not try him without delay.82 Senegal then amended its 
ex post facto laws and domesticated ICL to prosecute Habré through a special national 
chamber.83   
Habré was found guilty of all the charges against him in mid-2016, making him 
the first head of state to be personally convicted for rape.84 Additionally, Habré is the first 
head of state to be convicted of crimes against humanity by the courts of another country. 
His trial is also the first African-led prosecution based on universal jurisdiction.85 
Moreover, his trial undermines claims that the AU is not serious about addressing ICL 
violations.  
Moreover, African states have also considered the hybrid model in other contexts. 
For example, the peace agreement in South Sudan contains provision for a court to 
                                                          
80 Murungu, supra n 3.  
81 Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
82 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Summary 
of the Judgment, 2012/4 ICJ (20 July 2012). 
83 Murungu, supra n 3. 
84 Ruth Maclean, ‘Chad’s Hissène Habré Found Guilty of Crimes against Humanity,’ Guardian, 30 
May 2016. 
85 Ibid.  
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investigate ICL violations committed by both parties to the conflict.86 The AU is similarly 
supporting this move. At the time of writing, efforts to establish the court in South Sudan 
had stalled. Political leaders expressed a desire to focus on a truth and reconciliation 
process modeled after South Africa’s instead.87   
Additionally, the transitional government in the CAR passed legislation creating a 
hybrid court to adjudicate ICL crimes.88 It would be integrated in the national judiciary and 
would apply the law and criminal procedure of the CAR. The hybrid court would also be 
composed of national and international judges and staff. This is the first hybrid court 
created where the ICC has ongoing investigations. At the time of writing, the move to 
establish the court was taking place in fits and starts.89 There are real concerns about 
capacity, ongoing insecurity, the court’s relationship with the ICC and ensuring the court’s 
effectiveness. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, African hybrid courts have proven to be more 
promising than purely domestic trials. Yet, the hybrid processes have also faced issues of 
inadequate capacity and insufficient political will. African states’ experiences with these 
trials spurred the AU to create a permanent regional court as opposed to relying on the 
international community to create a hybrid institution or supporting separate institutions 
                                                          
86 BBC News, ‘African Union Announces South Sudan War Crimes Court,’ 29 September 2015. 
87 Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, ‘South Sudan Needs Truth, Not Trials,’ New York Times, 7 June 
2016. First Vice-President Machar disavowed the contents post-publication, but President Kiir 
stated that Machar was consulted. 
88 Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner, ‘Taking Justice to a New Level: The Special Criminal Court in the 
Central African Republic,’ Jurist, 9 July 2015. 
89 See, Amnesty International, South Sudan: Looking for Justice: Recommendations for the 
Establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (13 October 2016). 
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across the Continent. The experience with ICL trials also influenced the AU’s decision to 
create the RCC.  
 
3. International Criminal Trials 
The African ‘justice cascade’ includes ICL trials aimed at fostering greater accountability. 
The purported benefits of these trials include superior legal expertise for the development 
of ICL; less destabilization to fragile governments; less susceptibility to national politics; 
more impartiality; greater ability to investigate; more uniform justice; promotion and 
maintenance of international peace; and better credibility than national or hybrid 
processes.90 This subsection discusses the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the ICC’s experiences in Africa. 
The UNSC acted under Chapter VII of the Charter to create the ICTR in 1994 to 
prosecute alleged perpetrators of genocide and other violations of ICL.91 The ICTR was 
plagued by charges of inefficiency,92 and ceased operating in 2015. It indicted 93 
individuals with 61 resulting in convictions, while 14 individuals were acquitted, 10 
referred to national jurisdictions for trial, three individuals died prior to trial, three fugitives 
remain at large and two indictments were withdrawn.93 Notable sentences include one 
prime minister, four ministers and several others holding leadership positions. Yet, the 
ICTR did not prosecute anyone with connections to the Rwandan government for crimes 
                                                          
90 Alvarez, supra n 60. 
91 See, UN Charter. See also, ICTR Statute. 
92 See generally, Des Forges and Longman, supra n 61.  
93 UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, ‘The ICTR in Brief,’ 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (accessed 13 December 2016).   
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allegedly committed by the RPF.94 The Tribunal’s dependence on the government for 
cooperation likely explains the reticence to implicate those with government ties. Yet the 
ICTR’s actions legitimate RPF impunity at the international level,95 leaving the court with 
a tenuous legacy.  
Furthermore, during the ICTR’s operation, there were numerous tensions between 
the Tribunal and Rwanda, with the government politicizing and hindering the work of the 
Tribunal. It objected to the primacy of the ICTR over Rwandan courts, the location of the 
Tribunal in Tanzania and the ICTR’s decision to exclude the death penalty (prior to its 
abolishment in 2007).96 Yet, besides the death penalty’s abolishment and Rwanda’s review 
of its genocide ideology law, the ICTR has not contributed to the development of Rwanda’s 
judicial system.97 Moreover, there is scant empirical evidence that it has contributed to 
peace and reconciliation in Rwanda.98 
Notably, a crucial component of the completion strategy of the ICTR included 
referral of cases to Rwanda. In 2010, the UNSC created an International Residual 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, tasked with carrying out remaining functions of the 
ICTR, and the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.99  Compounding the perceived 
bias of ICL trials in Rwanda, the Residual Mechanism does not have jurisdiction to bring 
                                                          
94 Reportedly, the RPF killed at least 25,000 to 30,000 people, including civilians. Alison des Forges, 
Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
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charges against the RPF.  
Notwithstanding the above, it is uncontested that the ICTR established a historical 
record and contributed to the development of ICL. For instance, it set important legal 
precedents, including the recognition of rape as a means of perpetrating genocide.100 It was 
also the first ICL court to enter a judgment for genocide and, since Nuremberg, to issue a 
judgment against a former head of state.101 The ICTR contributed to the solidification of 
the justice cascade and the privileging of criminal trials over alternative conceptions of 
justice.  
This helped to pave the way for the creation of the ICC as a permanent global 
institution, which informed the RCC’s development. African states form the biggest 
regional bloc to the ICC, with 34 states parties out of 124.102 Almost all the ICC’s current 
situations involve Africans: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the CAR, Uganda, 
the Darfur region of Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.103 Five of these 
situations were the result of ‘self-referrals’ by the countries for investigations.104 These 
states have had a tendency of referring politically troublesome cases to the ICC even where 
                                                          
100 See, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment (2 September 
1998).  
101 See, UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, ‘ICTR Milestones,’ 
http://www.unmict.unictr.org/en/ictr-milestones (accessed 13 December 2016).  
102 ICC, ‘The States Parties to the Rome Statute,’ https://asp.icc-
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103 The ICC prosecutor opened an investigation in Georgia in January 2016. See, ICC, ‘Situations 
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they could conduct the prosecutions themselves. Self-referring governments have used the 
ICC for strategic aims to ‘delegitimize and incapacitate [political] enemies.’105 These states 
have appeared to be cooperating while undermining the ICC’s ability to be effective.106   
Further, the ICC has been unable to disentangle itself from geopolitics. For 
example, three P5 members on the UNSC have not ratified the Rome Statute.107 They can 
veto any referral to the ICC, effectively immunizing themselves and their allies from any 
potential prosecutions. Moreover, the UNSC’s referral of the Sudanese and Libyan 
situations provided immunity from prosecutions for non-state parties to the ICC that 
contributed peacekeepers in either country.108 This suggests a hierarchy of impunity based 
on the nationality of individuals that perpetrated the crimes. Indeed, the UNSC’s Sudanese 
and Libyan referrals risk turning the ICC into a diplomatic tool. Accordingly, the ICC has 
been charged with ignoring blatant human rights violations perpetrated by P5 members or 
their allies109 in selecting its situations.  
Some commentators charge the ICC with contributing to neo-imperialism, as the 
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Court is perceived as just another means used by the West to control Africa.110 In 2009, the 
AU decided that states should not cooperate with ICC prosecutions.111 Yet, African states’ 
views regarding noncooperation with the ICC are not monolithic. Indeed, some, like 
Botswana and Malawi, have signalled displeasure with the AU’s call for non-
cooperation.112 Yet, in early 2016, Kenya received support at an AU meeting for mass state 
withdrawal from the ICC.113 Recently, Burundi, South Africa and the Gambia formally 
announced their intentions to withdraw from the ICC.114 The ICC’s failure to adequately 
manage this crisis has undermined it. The current strained relationship is deeply 
problematic for the larger justice project, as the ICC’s effectiveness is completely 
dependent on states. 
The above challenges to the ICC are due to several factors. One aspect impacting 
the ICC’s credibility is its issuing of indictments during the midst of conflicts.115 The 
Uganda situation illustrates this concern, with some commentators perceiving the Court’s 
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indictments against rebel leaders as an incentive for them to remain fighting.116 Others 
question how committed the rebels previously were to negotiations and have argued for a 
more holistic approach to how the ICC facilitates peace.117   
Additionally, the ICC’s inability to apprehend suspects further weakens it.118 The 
indictment of Sudan’s president, al-Bashir, one of the Court’s most high-profile cases, 
exemplifies this. He is the first head of state to be reelected following an international arrest 
warrant. His reception in China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and some African states following the 
ICC’s indictment also highlights the Court’s lack of influence.119 The UNSC also failed to 
enforce six-year arrest warrants by taking coercive measures under its Chapter VII powers. 
In late 2014, the ICC conceded its ineffectualness in this case when the prosecutor 
suspended the Darfur investigations.120   
Moreover, the ICC’s credibility is reduced because some commentators perceive 
it as embroiling itself in local politics.121 This occurs when it issues one-sided indictments 
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in situations where the government is also implicated in abuses. For example, in the DRC 
the ICC issued indictments against militia leaders, but not any officials in the army, even 
though they are believed to be implicated in grave abuses.122 The ICC duplicated this in 
Côte d’Ivoire, where only government opponents were indicted, despite allegations that all 
sides were implicated in abuses.123   
Another example of the Court’s immersion in local politics is the Kenya situation. 
The ICC indicted six individuals for their alleged involvement in postelection violence that 
took place in Kenya in 2007/2008.124 Yet, the ICC did not indict the former prime minister 
and president who are arguably the individuals most responsible for actions taken by their 
subordinates.125 Strikingly, Kenya’s current president, Uhuru Kenyatta, and the deputy 
president, William Ruto, were elected following an ICC indictment.126 In 2013, three of 
the six Kenyan cases were dismissed for lack of evidence.127 The ICC’s high-profile cases 
against Kenyatta and Ruto also collapsed in December 2014 and April 2016, respectively, 
due to insufficient evidence.128 All of the above is not lost on the domestic populace and 
affects the perceived legitimacy of the ICC.129   
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The experience with ICL trials led by the ICC and the ICTR has left much to be 
desired. The anticipated benefits of more uniform justice as well as the promotion and 
maintenance of international peace have not lived up to expectations. ICL trials generally 
focus on individual cases and not on the complex relationships that exist between 
individuals, groups, institutions and other entities that make ICL violations possible.130 In 
the effort to move away from collectivizing guilt, which may lead to further violence, ICL 
trials often tend to absolve states, corporations, groups, institutions, bystanders and society 
of responsibility, as if individuals committed massive violations in a vacuum. ICL trials 
tend to focus on establishing individual accountability for a small number of crimes, which 
may present the opportunity for many criminal participants, including corporations, ‘to 
rationalize or deny their own responsibility for crimes.’131 As such, ICL trials are not aimed 
at determining the ‘truth,’132 but instead focus on whether a criminal standard of proof has 
been met, based on the limited charges brought and the individuals indicted.  
The RCC’s emergence seeks to disrupt some of this baggage associated with ICL 
trials. While not eliminating the history-distorting tendencies of ICL, the RCC expands the 
justice cascade due to its ability to prosecute crimes that other ICL courts do not cover. 
Moreover, the RCC’s provision for corporate criminal liability may advance the already 
limited ability of ICL trials to establish an accurate historical record. This would increase 
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the credibility of such trials, even if minimally. The section below discusses the potential 
for regionalizing criminal justice. 
 
C. REGIONALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE RCC 
Regional criminal justice adds greater significance to the justice cascade. Regional systems 
benefit from states with greater socioeconomic, environmental and security 
interdependence, because this encourages greater compliance with the decisions of regional 
bodies.133 This section discusses the benefits of a regional approach at a theoretical level, 
the RCC as gap-filler, potential context-specific remedies and procedure, as well as the 
prospects for norm promotion.  
 
1. Regional Approach  
Scholars have argued convincingly that regional problems of criminality deserve regional 
approaches.134 A regional approach is useful where regional conflicts and insecurity tend 
to spread.135 A regional approach recognizes the interconnectedness of states, and regional 
institutions can be created with mandates which do not ignore these dynamics. A regional 
court’s jurisdiction could be based on the reality of conflict lines, both territorially and 
temporally. Prosecutions could examine all aspects of criminality including the 
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transnational nature of abuses, perhaps limiting problems posed by lopsided investigations. 
A regional approach makes sense because the peace and security implications are often 
greatest within the region where massive crimes occur.  
Moreover, a regional approach could also limit the difficulties of determining 
competing claims. A regional body could circumvent situations where several states have 
a keen interest in exercising jurisdiction, and where one state’s exercise of jurisdiction 
inevitably frustrates the aspiration of other state(s).136 It also enhances victims’ rights by 
not attempting to adjudicate which society has the most valid claim.137 A regional 
approach could also ameliorate double-jeopardy concerns raised by the possibility of 
multiple prosecutions from different states. In sum, there are numerous theoretical benefits 
to regional criminal justice.  
 
2 .  R C C  a s  G a p - F i l l e r  
The AU’s decision to create the RCC was influenced by the desire to improve upon the 
continent’s experience with ICL trials. The RCC could help to serve as an intermediary 
between domestic institutions which violate or fail to enforce human rights, and the 
international system which alone cannot provide redress to individuals. The creation of the 
RCC may allow the ICC to concentrate on the most severe situations. This would allow the 
ICC to dedicate its limited resources more effectively. The ICC will never be able to deal 
with all situations involving ICL. Moreover, where the ICC does operate, the issuance of 
                                                          
136 See, Arrest Warrant Case.  
137 Frédéric Mégret, ‘ In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of 
International Criminal Justice,’ Cornell International Law Journal 38(3) (2005): 725–751. 
11 INT’L. J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (forthcoming March 2017) (peer-review) 
 30 
lopsided indictments means that a criminality gap will persist. Further, while the RCC 
cannot compensate for failures in domestic capacity, it is nonsensical to forego action at 
the regional level until or unless domestic or hybrid institutions are strengthened or created. 
The RCC could theoretically help to fill this gap by prosecuting situations that the ICC and 
national and hybrid institutions are not, by investigating quotidian crimes these institutions 
do not cover and by indicting individuals and entities that these institutions have not or 
cannot.  
There are numerous ways the RCC could fill justice gaps. First, due to the 
existence of geographic, historical and cultural bonds among states, decisions of regional 
bodies may meet with less resistance than global bodies.138 Because the court is linked to 
the regional political bodies of the AU, this may facilitate stricter oversight. For example, 
the AU has intervened in the Darfur, Sudan, in Burundi and in Somalia. The AU has also 
suspended Mauritania and Togo from membership for unconstitutional changes of 
government.139 While intervention and suspension of membership are not synonymous 
with ICL accountability, they evidence that in theory and in practice the AU can challenge 
sovereignty and the principle of noninterference when sufficient political will exists. Other 
relevant regional bodies that may assist with compliance include the Panel of the Wise and 
the Peace and Security Council.  
                                                          
138 Chaloka Beyani, ‘Reconstituting the Universal: Human Rights as a Regional Idea,’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law, ed. Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
139 Jeremy Sarkin, ‘The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-Regional 
Organizations in Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian 
Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,’ Journal of African Law 53(1) (2009): 1–33.  
11 INT’L. J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (forthcoming March 2017) (peer-review) 
 31 
Yet, regional embeddedness will not fully address issues of noncompliance.140 For 
example, the AU has been notoriously silent about violations taking place in countries with 
influential or revered leaders. The RCC could be subject to the same criticisms leveled 
against the ICC for lack of sufficient independence from the UNSC, but this time with 
respect to AU political bodies. Yet cooperation, even if de minimus, would not be 
insignificant because the lack of global or regional police power necessitates that 
supranational institutions use shaming and moral suasion to change the behavior of 
nonconforming states. These strategies may be more effective regionally where states are 
in constant contact.141   
 
3. Remedies and Procedure  
Regional bodies may also be better placed to respond to ICL violations because of their 
ability to develop more familiar systems of redress. In addition to imposing sentences and 
forfeiture of any property following a conviction, the RCC is empowered to provide 
compensation and reparation to victims.142 The Protocol also provides a trust fund for 
victims for legal aid and assistance.  While the ICC has similar provisions,143 the RCC may 
be better placed to fashion remedies that resonate. For instance, if the RCC follows the lead 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in fashioning remedies, it might order 
                                                          
140 For a discussion of difficulties securing cooperation with the ICTR and SCSL, see, George 
William Mugwanya, ‘International Criminal Tribunals in Africa,’ in The African Regional Human 
Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ed. Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2012). 
141 Mugwanya, supra n 140. 
142 Malabo Protocol.   
143 Rome Statute, arts. 68 (victim’s representatives), 75 (reparations for victims), 79 (trust fund for 
victims).  
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communal reparations,144 or formulate broad reparative measures.145 It could require that 
states end violations through formulating specific policies and programs.146 The RCC 
might also develop something akin to the margin of appreciation doctrine used by the 
European Court of Human Rights,147 to avoid determining issues where there is regional 
diversity on ICL issues.148 Additionally, the Court could seek to work with other structures 
in the AU, such as the Peace Fund or the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
Framework, to provide redress.  
Further, the RCC may be better equipped to account for variations in procedural 
traditions.149 For example, the Court might even require a convicted defendant to 
participate in local reconciliatory procedures akin to gacaca as a means of securing 
reparations to victims. It is premature to determine how broadly the Court will construe its 
provisions. Yet the potential flexibility could be an improvement on the ‘imagined victims’ 
of ICL that always demand retributive justice and support trials unquestionably. Instead, 
victims have diverse desires for redress.150 This is particularly important in some 
communities where justice is conceptualized in terms of communal restoration, 
                                                          
144 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs 
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interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation, and a redistributive, rather than retributive, 
process. Thus, the RCC may embody the mantra of ‘African solutions to African 
problems.’ 
 
4. Norm Promotion  
Like the hybrid courts, the RCC’s proximity to those affected could increase the likelihood 
of norm promotion.151 It is also conceivable that the RCC may be similarly remote from 
impacted communities like the ICTR or the ICC and this could influence its effectiveness 
and perceived legitimacy and credibility. However, the RCC may serve as a platform for 
positive complementarity – as a resource for hybrid and domestic efforts at prosecuting 
ICL violations in Africa. The RCC could provide guidelines for regional best practices and 
help to strengthen domestic and hybrid efforts adjudicating ICL. 
Yet, regionalization of ICL could result in a ‘race to the bottom,’ with countries 
seeking lower barriers to entry. That is, instead of states deciding to bind themselves to 
higher obligations, they can seek to lower their obligations. For example, irrespective of 
what CIL provides as a background norm,152 the immunities provision is in stark contrast 
to the trend for ICL tribunals not to grant official immunity. As such, it may be that the 
flexibility provided by regionalization is undesirable, given the need to maintain certain 
baselines in the justice cascade.  
                                                          
151 For a discussion on how regional organizations are better at persuading states because of local 
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The RCC’s innovation in the quotidian and crisis crimes covered, as well as the 
range of actors that can be held liable, may also push the boundaries of ICL in a much-
needed direction, especially if other states mimic these provisions. For example, the RCC 
could allow for greater coordination on the regulation of corporate activity, and allow states 
to respond more effectively to the challenges posed by large corporations. The RCC’s 
provision for corporate criminal liability puts pressure on the prevailing legal landscape 
both within and outside of Africa. These doctrinal innovations are much needed to render 
the justice cascade more germane. 
Moreover, there is already some evidence that regional human rights bodies are 
beginning to address ICL issues outside of Africa.153 For example, the quasi-criminal 
review of the Inter-American Court goes beyond the Court’s strictly human rights 
mandate.154 The Inter-American Court innovated by construing prosecutions for ICL 
violations as an equitable remedy to human rights violations.155 This is noteworthy when 
one considers that ‘no state has ever fully complied with an Inter-American Court order to 
prosecute or punish an international crime.’156 The African system is improving on this 
innovation by seeking to adjudicate both ICL violations and systematic quotidian crimes 
regionally. Both regions indicate that the expansion of the sphere of influence of regional 
human rights bodies to encompass ICL issues is a phenomenon that is not fleeting.  
                                                          
153 See generally, Alexandra Huneeus, ‘International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts,’ American Journal of International Law 107(1) 
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In sum, the Malabo Protocol provides potentially more contextually tailored solutions than 
previously provided at the international level, by criminalizing conduct that is regionally 
salient and expanding the actors that can be held liable to include corporations. The 
Protocol also seeks to improve upon inefficiencies in the justice cascade that exist from 
relying on the domestic judiciary of member states, or the creation of hybrid courts. Yet, 
the Protocol’s provision for official immunity, while allowed under CIL, may still be an 
undesirable retraction of the justice cascade.  If established, the RCC may face familiar 
challenges marshaling political will and resources to carry out prosecutions. Yet with all 
its imperfections, it represents an attempt by African states to offer an alternative vision of 
regional criminal justice that perhaps is better suited to Africa’s realities and aspirations.  
